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ABSTRACT 
Various C02 permit schemes have been proposed as equitable, 
efficient, and politically acceptable means to effectively address 
the threat of global climate change. The present analysis suggests 
the direction, level, and terms of trade in North-South permit 
trading. Domestic permit market failure and international 
development aid experience are drawn upon for insight into a global 
permit system. The conclusion emphasizes inconsistencies in 
permit theory and the unfair and inefficient consequences of 
international application. Promoting the profitability of abatement 
in the developed world and a restructuring of development aid in the 
developing world is suggested in lieu of a single market approach. 
• 
•. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) arose out 
of both cooperation and conflict. Be it North vs. South, rich vs. poor, 
development vs. environment, or fairness vs. efficiency, more often 
than not, negotiators working towards a common goal found no 
common ground. The final Convention signed at the Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro succeeded in universal acceptability, but at the 
expense of specificity, effectiveness, and equity. 
Given the global nature of the cause and effects of climate 
change, an effective treaty requires widespread international 
cooperation. Cooperation, in turn, involves addressing both 
international equity and economic efficiency considerations. 
Chapman and Drennen (1990) define effectiveness as the impact on 
deferring a doubling of carbon dioxide (C02) concentration, and 
equity as the ratio of per capita consumption of fossil energy by 
developing countries to that by industrialized countries. 
The Framework Convention suggests a freeze in industrial 
country emissions of C02, with a disregard for developing nation 
population and aggregate energy growth. Given the above definitions 
of equity and effectiveness, such a freeze would result in a C02 
doubling in approximately 65 years and a small equity ratio 
improvement from 10:100 to 16:100 in 50 years (Drennen,1992a). In 
contrast, a C02 doubling is projected in 71 years under a business­
•
as-usual reference case. It seems clear the the Framework 
Convention is not effective. 
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Consequently, the theory of tradable pollution permits has 
been proposed by many, both North and South!, as a step towards a 
more effective, equitable and efficient means to greenhouse gas 
abatement. Initial attention has focused primarily on carbon dioxide 
(C02) due to its majority share of past and predicted radiative 
forcing, and the relative ease of national emissions computation. 
Most recently, a United Nations sponsored group of lawyers, 
economists, and energy specialists have thoroughly analyzed a 
system of tradable carbon entitlements (UNCTAD, 1992). The 
proposal was brought to Rio and has stimulated widespread support 
for market-incentive based climate change policy. 
The present paper examines the theory of tradable permits in 
the context of North-South trading. Both the theoretical and 
application strength in the international setting is evaluated based 
on domestic permit experience, the history of world trade, and past 
export-led development efforts in the Third World. The conclusion 
criticizes tradable permits, supports the general direction of the 
Framework Convention, and suggests a more feasible, equitable, 
efficient, effective, and precedented step towards global climate 
protection. 
• 
1 North and South are used throughout to generalize the middle to high income, 
.' 
industrialized nations of North America, Europe, former Soviet Union, Japan, Australia, 
and New Zealand, and the low income, developing nations of Africa, Latin America, and 
non-Soviet Asia, respectively. 
4 
THEORETICAL PROPOSALS 
The attraction of tradable permit schemes of pollution control 
is the theoretical attainment of both efficiency and fairness goals. 
Efficiency is viewed at the global market level as minimizing total 
abatement costs. The minimization path requires distributing the 
costs of C02 abatement to the lowest cost abaters. By assigning 
tradable permits, rather than inflexible uniform standards, national 
emissions decisions become internalized into rational cost 
minimization behavior. Nations adjust to their level of abatement 
by weighing the market cost of a permit against their unique 
marginal abatement costs (MACs). Revenue from permit sales 
provides an incentive to overcontrol and develop better abatement 
techniques. Through trading in a perfectly competitive market, C02 
is abated at the lowest possible cost. 
Fairness is generally viewed as distributing the burden of C02 
abatement equitably. The few have realized a disproportionate 
benefit from the fires of industrialization, and now the many must 
face the consequences. Equity demands that the nations mainly 
responsible for any current commitment to global climate change, 
namely the industrialized world, should be allocated the majority of 
abatement burden. A two region political agenda arises: (1) reduce 
C02 emissions in the North without adversely affecting the 
industrial status quo, and (2) promote sustainable development in 
the South to increase standards of living while limiting rapid 
emissions growth. Tradable permits attempt to meet this challenge 
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through allocating equitable emissions rights and providing a market 
mechanism for North to South wealth and technology transfer. 
In theory, the achievement of efficiency and fairness are 
separable. No matter how permits are distributed, a perfectly 
competitive and rational market will distribute the abatement 
burden to the least cost abater until all MCs are equalized. Thus 
most attention has turned to questions of equity in distributing 
permits. Numerous allocation schemes exist (see Rose,1992), most 
with the same central components: a surplus of permits in the 
South, a deficit of permits in the North. 
As a basis for further analysis it is useful to quantify the 
extremes of permit schemes and their compromises. Table 1 lists 
the typical reference data by national income category. The total 
number of permits might initially be set at 5.8 billion based on 1990 
tons of world industrial carbon emissions. At one extreme, this 
total could be distributed based on shares of 1990 emissions. All 
nations would then be required to either reduce emissions to 1990 
levels, buy permits from another country, or a combination of both. 
In the tradition of permit theory, trading would be based strictly on 
differences in MACs since no permit surpluses exist. While such a 
distribution would be extremely beneficial to the status quo, 
fairness objectives fail. The North is essentially rewarded for past 
C02 emissions and the South's future development options are 
stifled, particularly if Southern permits are sold. 
To promote distributional fairness, it is necessary to depart 
from the traditional emissions reference base. Often an egalitarian 
per capita approach is suggested at the other extreme, assigning 
Country Group 
World 
Low-Income 
Middle-Income 
High-Income 
Other Economies(d) 
\0 
-
Table 1. Reference Data by Income Group (1990) 
(Source: World Bank, 1992) 
.
 
Population GNP Industrial Carbon 
Emissions{a) 
mill. tons C 
5,822 
3,058 1,070 350 1,036,662	 952 
1,088 2,409 2,220 1,476,416 1,061 
816 15,998 19,590 4,208,928 2,702 
321 2,696 8,400 1,549,788 1,089 
Notes; 
Low-Income : $610 or less 
Middle-Inc : $611-$7619 
High-Inc : $7620 or more 
(a) 1989 Data 
(b)	 Commercial forms of primary energy - petroleum and natural gas liquids, 
natural gas, solid fuels, and primary electricity (nuclear, geo, and hydro) 
(c) Per capita weighted average * population 
(d) Cuba, Korea(PDR), Former Soviet Union 
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permits according to a nation's share of world population during a 
base year. Thus every person, rich or poor, has an equal right to emit 
C02. Table 2 demonstrates the magnitude of permit surpluses that 
are created in the low and middle income groups, and the permit 
deficits created in the high income and former Soviet Union. 
Assuming a $40 market permit price (a ballpark figure given pricing 
assumptions such as found in UNCTAD, 1992), the maximum transfer 
from North to South is over $1 trillion. Agarwal and Narain (1991) 
propose a twist to the egalitarian approach by assigning per capita 
rights to the world's sinks of the various GHGs. Only two developed 
countries (Albania and Portugal) fall within their sinkable limits for 
C02. Permits can then be traded for natural "sink space" available in 
the South with the excess users in the North. This image of 
egalitarian shares of the earth's cleansing capacity depicts the 
South rising to their sustainable level of emissions, and the North 
falling to theirs. 
In all likelihood, an emissions sovereignty base wouldn't be 
accepted by the South, and an egalitarian base, rewarding past 
population growth and promoting huge transfers, wouldn't be 
accepted by the North. To rectify the two extremes, Grubb and 
Sebenius (1992) suggest a weighting scheme which has gained 
widespread support. The population and emissions bases are given 
separate weights in determining periodic permit allocations. Base 
year emissions would be weighted more heavily at first and slide to 
• 
zero over time, eventually reaching a per capita allocation. Table 3 
represents an initial allocation with a 90% current emissions 
.. 
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Table 2. Permit Distribution • Egalitarian 
Country Group Current Emissions Per Capita
 
1990 Base
 
mill. tons C
 
World 5,822 
Low-Income 952 3,369 2,417 $96,694 
Middle-Income 1,061 1,199 138 $5,511 
High-Income 2,702 899 (1,803) -$72,117 
Other Economies 1,089 354 (735) -$29,413 
Table 3. Permit Distribution . Weighted Scheme 
Country Group Current Emissions Population
 
1990 Base
 
mill. tons C
 
World 5,822 
Low-Income 952 3,058 1,194 242 
Middle-Income 1,061 1,088 1,075 14 
High-Income 2,702 816 2,522 (180) 
Other Economies 1,089 321 1,015 (74 ) 
~ 
(a) 1 permit = 1 ton of carbon 
(b) Assumes all available permit surpluses are purchased 
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weight and a 10% population weight. Low income nations still retain 
their permit surpluses but at a much lower level. 
DISTRIBUTION OF MARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS 
The theory of tradable permits, as it was developed for 
domestic externalities, depends heavily on differences in MACs. 
Abatement costs for traditionally controlled emissions such as 
particulate matter, S02 (sulfur dioxide), NOx (nitrous oxides), and 
VOCs (volatile organic compounds), have involved expensive 
techniques such as fuel switching, flue gas scrubbing, or plant 
closures. Initial attempts of estimating C02 MACs have been heavily 
influenced by these past methodologies and include costs of 
changing from fossil to non-fossil fuels, afforestation, C02 
scrubbing, and limiting economic growth. Nordhaus (1991) reports 
the costs of C02 scrubbing in the range of $55 to $120 per ton of C, 
and of substituting methane for oil and gas in electrical generation 
from $300 to $700 per ton of C. Rose and Stevens (1992) find a 
general consensus of relatively higher mitigation costs in the 
industrialized nations. For instance, they estimate MAC's for the 
U.S., Canada, and Western Europe between $29 and $34 for a 10% C02 
reduction, while the same estimates lie at about $7 for Indonesia 
and Brazil. 
These estimates aim to reduce emissions without reducing 
total energy consumption, and presumably, maintain economic 
output. What they fail to incorporate are energy efficiency 
• 
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techniques which reduce energy consumption without affecting, or 
at times improving, economic output. Energy consumption is itself 
an expense. Before a rational nation would ever undertake huge 
expenses such as C02 scrubbing, it would most likely utilize 
measures to get the same or more output from less energy input. 
Rubin et al. (1992) suggest that "a variety of energy efficiency 
and other measures that are now available could reduce U.S. 
emissions of greenhouse gases by roughly 10 to 40% of current 
levels at relatively low cost, perhaps at a net cost savings." The 
majority of these cuts come from C02. Innovations in lighting, 
heating, and refrigeration pay for themselves in energy savings. 
Likewise, higher fuel efficiency standards and power plant 
improvements can occur at zero and negative net costs. Similarly, 
Flavin and Lenssen (1990) conclude that by implementing cost­
effective technologies the U.S. could "cut its projected annual carbon 
emissions by more than 20 percent by the year 2010, and in so doing 
save about $35 billion annually." 
Figure 1 demonstrates the importance of a departure from 
traditional "cost with no benefits" estimates. When group II'S MACs 
are assumed negative at first, the likely outcome is similar to curve 
I 1-1; a dramatic shift from the traditional cost estimates such as 
curve I I-h. In this low MAC scenario, Northern MAC's remain less 
than Southern MAC's throughout the abatement spectrum. In 
addition, the amount of reductions that can occur are constrained by 
• 
current carbon emissions for each nation group. Thus even when 
MAC's for group I I are estimated to be higher than for group I, a 
point occurs when MAC curves must cross due to the constraining 
• 
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asymptote of smaller current emissions in the less developed 
nations. 
Figure 1. Marginal Abatement Cost Assumptions 
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Furthermore, energy conservation promotes opportunities, not 
opportunity costs, for new markets, jobs, profits, and greater energy 
independence. Development of "clean" technologies, renewable 
energy, recycling processes, and sustainable resource stocks are the 
•trends of the future and promise to increase employment 
opportunities (see Renner, 1991). For much of the industrialized 
world, initial C02 minimization means profit maximization . 
• 
1 2
 
President Bush's "No Regrets Policy" in the final climate 
negotiations is based on these premises of alternative benefits to 
C02 reduction. The U.S. held that their C02 emissions would be cut by 
7-11 % of projected emissions for the year 2000 due to other 
policies which made political and economic sense aside from 
addressing the uncertainties of climate change (Drennen, 1992b). 
Such policies include the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and a 
future National Energy Strategy. 
If MACs in the North lie beneath MACs in the South throughout 
or over a significant portion of abatement, or if nations are reducing 
C02 for non-climate change reasons, serious doubts are thrown on 
popular notions of the direction of trade in C02 permits. Theory 
dictates that low cost abaters are sellers of permits. Therefore, 
the majority emitters of C02 would reduce wasteful emissions for a 
profit, or at least with relatively low costs, a nd profit from the 
sale of permits to the developing world. Of course, this makes no 
sense in terms of fairness, politics, or if the Third World held 
permit surpluses; yet theory fully supports this notion. In all 
likelihood, a permit system based on such a distribution of MACs 
would result in no trade, cost-effective abatement in the North, and 
zero assistance to the South. In terms of global market efficiency, 
C02 reduction should occur in the North anyway, where MACs are 
lowest. In terms of fairness objectives, sustainable development 
assistance for the Third World is left to a Northern favored market 
• 
mechanism, in which little or no wealth and technology transfer are 
likely to occur. 
,. 
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THE FALLACY OF THEORY 
To further evaluate claims to efficiency and fairness, it is 
necessary to take two steps back and quantify the level and terms of 
trade in a C02 permit system if North to South wealth transfer 
would indeed occur. After all, the case of U.S. energy inefficiencies 
doesn't necessarily apply across the board. In fact, current 
economies such as Japan and Germany may have already exhausted 
much of their "free" abatement opportunities in response to the oil 
shocks of the 1970's. For instance, Japan's Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry assumed vast powers to allocate fuel and power, 
promoting stringent factory conservation measures, while passing 
higher costs on to the consumer. Development and installation of 
energy-efficient industrial processes followed suit, and highly 
energy-intensive industries were relocated abroad (Delfs, 1992). 
Furthermore, it can't be ruled out that Northern nations would 
act irrationally and buy permits from the South despite negative or 
low MACs. Significant implementation barriers and costs currently 
exist towards energy efficiency strategies and may continue to 
persist (see Rubin et aI., 1992). Such "hidden" costs also raise 
Northern MACs. Lastly, steeper cuts in C02 emissions, beyond low 
cost options, may require relatively more expensive abatement in 
the North given C02 dependent lifestyles. 
• 
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Buyer Marginal Cost Pricing 
In theory, permit prices are set by the anonymous forces of the 
market which push to equalize MACs between players. Given popular 
permit distribution scenarios in which the South holds a surplus and 
the North faces a deficit, such a marginal cost pricing system fails. 
A C02 limit in the North constrains current emissions as they must 
weigh the cost of abatement against the cost of a permit, 
essentially setting the ceiling on a permit price. To an 
underdeveloped nation, however, with a surplus of permits, their C02 
entitlement is a non-binding constraint having a marginal value of 
zero. A poor nation certainly can't afford to exercise the pollution 
rights granted by surplus permits, and in fact, may be depending on 
surplus permit sales for development assistance. The only option 
available is to sell at whatever price it can receive. 
Southern permits would be sold to the North because they have 
no Southern use, a clear departure from buyer/seller marginal cost 
pricing. Market power tips in favor of the buyer, but exercising such 
power depends on another critical assumption of competitive theory: 
the anonymity and neutrality of a world C02 permit market. 
Domestic Market Failure 
To gain insight into the workings of a North-South C02 permit 
• 
market it is necessary to evaluate past domestic experience with 
tradable pollution permits. Applications have occurred in regulating 
conventional air pollutants, lead in gasoline, ozone-depleting 
e· 
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chemicals, water pollution, and acid rain (see Tietenberg, 1992). 
The U.S. experience with tradable permit schemes typically grounds 
the support for international application. Given recent analysis, 
grounds for criticism seem more appropriate. 
The U.S. experience was formalized with the 1977 amendments 
to the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970. The amendments created partial 
permit schemes by incorporating emission reduction credits (ERCs) 
in systems of emissions bubbles, offsets, netting, and credit 
banking. Market size limitations, system design flaws, and 
unfaithful markets have limited the trading and subsequently, 
restricted the potential cost savings. In the past five years, the 
historical praise of permits turned into an evaluation of "what went 
wrong" as only fractions of theoretical efficiency gains were 
realized. 
Theory assumes anonymity and price taking behavior for all 
market players. Yet Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) quantify a 
critical flaw in U.S. permit market design: trades were bilateral 
and sequential. When permit trades develop through a sale by sale, 
source to source, negotiated process, the efficiencies from perfect 
competition are diminished considerably. The opportunity to 
exercise market power prevails as the neutrality of price taking 
behavior is lost and permit prices fall victim to the distortion of 
price asking behavior. No market price is created, and trading 
becomes a belabored, uncertain process. 
• 
This uncertainty combined with high transaction costs placed 
further limits on the amount of transfer that occurred in the U.S. 
permit market. Raufer and Feldman (1987) surveyed a number of U.S. 
..
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electric utilities to determine the internal symptoms of domestic 
permit market failure. More than 95% of the transactions occurred 
within firms. Sufficient amounts of ERCs were generated through 
overcontrol and plant retirements, however, very few were banked 
or externally traded due to lack of faith in the market. The basic 
fear was that overcontrol wouldn't get credit or would be made 
mandatory. In fact, instances existed where banked credits were 
confiscated by regulators. Hoarding ERCs was simply rational, risk 
averse behavior. As a result, far less advances in emissions 
controls were created from the so-called market incentive system. 
The survey also revealed the tremendous transaction costs 
involved in external trades, diminishing payback on overcontrol 
considerably. For example, Pacific Gas & Electric sponsored a study 
to locate emissions offsets in the San Francisco Bay area which 
lasted 10 months, cost $56,000, and found only 1 out of 200 sources 
willing to sell. The utility eventually spent $70,000 on an offset, 
slightly more than the searching costs alone. This union of buyer 
and seller occurred within the same state, with the same language, 
the same currency, the same government, the same culture, and the 
same market power. The complications in a North-South national 
trade could far exceed this domestic example. 
Domestic Experience to International Application 
There is no evidence to suggest that an international permit 
market could avoid the above 'flaws in domestic application. The 
history of world trade is based on bilateral and sequential trading. 
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Import/export contracts are negotiated on a price bidding system, 
fully susceptible to market power influence. Oil and grain markets 
may be the only sound exceptions that exist, and even so, prices are 
dictated by actions taken in wealthy nations. 
An international C02 permit market seems particularly 
susceptible to the distortions of uncertainty and high transaction 
costs, although for different reasons. National C02 emissions from 
fossil fuel use can be roughly estimated on a "what goes in, must 
come out" basis, but emissions from land use changes are only best 
guesses. Such uncertainty weighs heavily on crediting maintenance 
for national carbon sinks. 
Article 4 of the Framework Convention requires national 
inventories of sources and sinks for C02 and other GHGs. Fulfilling 
this requirement would help alleviate some uncertainty, however, 
political bickering seems more likely. The IPCC quantifies carbon 
sources of 7.0 +/- 0.5 GtC/yr and sinks of 5.4 +/- 1.0 GtC/yr, 
indicating a missing sink of 1.6 +/- 1.4 GtC/yr (Drennen, 1992b). 
The battle for rights to such a sizable sink can only delay inventory 
requirements and add to the frustrations of market uncertainty. 
Fluctuations in exchange and interest rates, evolving 
scientific knowledge, North-South information barriers, and 
implications of market power, all enforce international uncertainty. 
The information, infrastructure, and financial transaction 
requirements to compete in world trade further impede a North­
•South trade zone. In addition, the costs of enforcing abatement are 
.. 
magnified given the weak international nature of record keeping and 
legally binding enforcement mechanisms. The element of trade adds 
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sufficient enforcement costs that may far outweigh costs of 
uniform standards. In fact, the economic conditions for minimizing 
abatement costs and minimizing enforcement costs may differ (see 
Malik, 1992). 
Still, advocates of tradable permits feel valuable lessons have 
been learned from the past and look to the 1990 CAA amendments as 
precedents for the future. The amendments outline the creation of a 
national permit market for controlling sulfur dioxide (S02) 
emissions, the principal component of acid deposition. In addition, 
they encourage the privatization of a spot and futures market to 
handle transactions. The Chicago Board of Trade is in the process of 
establishing a S02 permit trading floor (see Walters, 1992), and 
soon the potential of theoretical efficiencies may finally be 
realized. However, the first trade between Wisconsin Power and 
Light and the Tennessee Valley Authority resumed the past bilateral 
process. 
The UNCTAD (1992) report proposes the eventual creation of a 
similar international C02 permit spot and futures market. It must be 
emphasized that North-South world trading is extremely more 
complex than the relative uniformity of a domestic market. An 
international spot and futures market would have to bridge canyons 
between the" diversity of currencies, market access, and trading 
power between nations. In modern domestic markets everyone is 
more or less an equal player. In a North-South world market, 
inequality is the rule, not the exception. For an international C02 
permit market to overcome the stigma of past domestic market 
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failure would be a tremendous task. To reverse the nature of world 
trade would be an economic, cultural, and political miracle. 
TRADABLE PERMITS IN THE GLOBAL STATUS QUO 
Arguments for the location of market power and the means to 
exercise it have been outlined. It is now necessary to raise these 
criticisms against tradable permits in the context of the history of 
North-South, rich-poor, post-colonial relations. A clearer economic 
interpretation of a worldwide C02 permit system will then become 
evident. 
North-South Trade in Perspective 
Trade has often been viewed as a means by which developing 
nations move out of poverty and on to the road to prosperity. In 
theory, establishing export industries in the Third World brings in 
foreign currency to buy products and services necessary for a 
modern, industrial culture. The Newly Industrialized Countries 
(NICs) of the Pacific Rim, have taken this theory to heart through 
massive export growth. In fact, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong "have forged the fastest industrial revolutions the world 
has ever seen" (Asia's Emerging Economies, 1991). GNP growth rates 
-
doubled and tripled that of OECD nations throughout the 1980's. The 
NICs have been successful through developing a level of economic 
integrity with a commitment to education, infrastructure, domestic 
20
 
investment, and control over their own destinies. However, export­
led growth does not always have this result. 
Take the case of sub-Saharan Africa. Export-led development 
initiated by First World corporations and multilateral institutions 
has not been successful. Fantu Cheru (1989) describes a continent 
controlled by the forces of a Northern market and a people in which 
"development has always meant the progressive modernization of 
their poverty." Rather than build capital from development aid, 
Africa became a net exporter of capital in the 1980's. OPEC oil 
shocks, shortfalls in export earnings, and declining Official 
Development Assistance, kept debt growing at 25% per year 
throughout the 1970's and early 80's. In 1986, Africa received $18 
billion in aid, yet paid out $15 billion in debt service. During the 
same year, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) took out $1 billion 
more than it put in (Cheru, 1989). 
Cheru emphasizes that entire African economies are dependent 
"on the export of a few commodities to a limited number of 
markets." When world demand for these products declines, or the 
dollar appreciates, or international interest rates soar (Le. 20% in 
1981-82), African economies are destroyed. The export earnings 
that do accumulate are applied towards debt. In 1983, an average of 
25% of export earnings were used to service debt. Tanzania, Sudan, 
and Zambia were applying over 100% of export earnings towards debt 
servicing (Cheru, 1989). 
• 
Sub-Saharan Africa is one case of a host of Third World 
regions in which export-led development has produced tremendous 
debt burdens and Northern market dependency. In fact, Africa's debt 
..
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burden pales in comparison to the majority of the developing world. 
The Third World as a whole owed $1.2 trillion in 1989 (nearly one 
half its cumulative GNP) and in 1988 sent $43 billion more to the 
industrialized world in debt service than they received in new 
capital (Tietenberg, 1990). 
A permit market in which the South is the exporter and the 
North is the importer is essentially another export-led development 
strategy. Instead of exporting cheap natural resources or pollution 
intensive products, the South will export its right to develop. In 
addition, Kinuthia and Nyangena (1991) speculate the immediate 
impact of tradable permits may be to increase costs of African 
imports due to increased costs to producers in the purchase of 
permits. Given Africa's dependence on imports for manufactures, 
the shifting of Northern permit cost to the Southern capital 
importers can only further deteriorate terms of trade. Depending on 
the elasticity of import demand, the entire cost of a U.S. permit 
could be shifted through the price of a Kenyan import. 
Supporters of permits claim they can be distributed such that 
the South has su'fficient cushion to develop sustainably plus extra 
permits to sell and finance this development. If history truly does 
repeat itself, the majority of developing nations will find new 
dependence in the export of C02 permits, the developed world will 
control the terms of trade, and Northern demanded environmental 
goals will be upheld at the expense of Southern impoverishment. 
• 
22 
Monopsony Power and Perfect Price Discrimination 
In an effort to summarize the terms of trade in an 
international C02 permit market, it is useful to adopt two notions of 
economic theory departing from the social optimum of perfect 
co mpetitio n. 
First, given location of market power and the traditional 
mechanisms available to exercise such power, the few, rich, energy 
inefficient nations can collectively act as a monopsonist. 
Considerable trade unionization currently exists in the 
industrialized world as the dollar, deutsche-mark, and yen economic 
blocs emerge from the post-cold war. Developed nations may 
collectively act, while the multitude of disorganized, poor permit 
exporters accept any income transfer available. Similar to a factory 
in a one factory town, where suppliers of labor have no choice but to 
take the wage rate set, permit exporters have no choice but to 
accept any permit price offered. 
Monopsony power carries with it a second type of market 
power: the ability to discriminate perfectly between permit 
sellers. In the bilateral trading process described above, buyers and 
sellers are not anonymous, and no market price exists. The North 
could pick and choose between developing nations and exploit its 
monopsony power to set prices it deemed appropriate. Trade would 
most likely exploit the weakest of the weak first, and then move up 
the scale sequentially until market barriers such as uncertainty and 
transaction costs prevailed. 
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Corruption 
There is a need to address perhaps the greatest barrier to 
efficient and fair North to South transfer, namely the presence of 
widespread corruption in First/Third World relationships. 
Corruption certainly isn't unique to this setting, only more blatantly 
pervasive, definable, and debilitating. 
To extend the example of sub-Saharan Africa, export earnings 
often vanish into the pockets of corruption. Nothing represents its 
presence more than the image of the African "Big Men" rulers and 
their kinship with the power and greed of Western exploitation. 
Blaine Harden (1990) describes the realities of the "kleptocratic" 
state in the case of Zaire and its self-proclaimed Big Man, Mobutu 
Sese Seko. Mobutu himself describes the system as follows: "In a 
word, everything is for sale, anything can be bought in our country. 
And in this flow, he who holds the slightest cover of public 
authority uses it illegally to acquire money, goods, prestige or to 
avoid obligations." Northern industry and government have built 
Mobutu's personal wealth to an estimate of over $5 billion. In 
return, Zaire's copper and cobalt are obtained at less than market 
prices (Chapman, 1992a). All the while, the people of Zaire are left 
with the eighth poorest nation in the world in which "poor nutrition 
and poor health care leave one-third of Zairian children dead before 
age five" (Harden, 1990). 
Many nations of Africa are ruled by similar Big Men, in which 
bribes, not market prices, run First to Third World ventures. In an 
• 
.' 
international C02 permit market, Africa would likely have large 
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permit surpluses for sale, and to the "kleptocratic" system, the 
opportunity is welcomed. Nation to nation trade strictly flows 
funds into state hands, precisely where corrupt practices are most 
prevalent and debilitating. Past exploitation of the African populace 
could only continue through sales of such "Mobutu entitlements." 
The example of Zaire, or sub-Saharan Africa in general, isn't 
used to plead for the extreme cases of corruption and self interest. 
It is employed rather as a reminder of the legacy of export-led 
development, Western implanted free-market idealism, and the 
realities of the international market place. C02 reductions and 
development aid transfer, left to the blind eyes of the marketplace, 
scantily resemble popular notions of fairness and efficiency. 
FIRST WORLD WASTE AND THIRD WORLD POVERTY 
Continued, unsustainable C02 emissions growth stems from 
two sources: the disproportionate, uneconomical, wasteful burning 
of fossil fuels in the North, and the unsustainable, resource 
degradation and future "dirty" development forced by poverty in the 
South. Disguising the causes under a single global market avoids the 
realities of the situation. Effectively addressing the causes, and 
thus tackling climate change, requires a direct commitment in 
abatement from the North and development cooperation with the 
• 
South. 
First, it has been argued above that both responsibility and 
lowest cost abatement lie within the borders of the industrialized 
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world. So why let an irrational, unpredictable, inequitable market 
allocate the burden of C02 abatement if global fairness and 
efficiency already dictate its location? The Framework Convention 
establishes a precedent in this direction. It requires adoption of 
national policies by developed country parties detailing plans to 
return C02 and other GHG emissions "individually or jointly" to 1990 
levels (Drennen, 1992b). A departure from this step of commitment 
towards a market system would allow for tremendous ambiguities in 
abatement responsibility and ultimately shift the burden 
disproportionately to the weakest market players. 
Secondly, it's more feasible and effective to restructure 
current development assistance efforts than to impose an 
unprecedented, unpredictable market mechanism for transfering 
development funds. Sustainable development requires Northern 
assistance. Yet tradable permits offer a process that buys Southern 
development rights. Rather than transfer aid to the "kleptocratic" 
state through selling C02 rights to the wealthy, inefficienct state, 
assistance would be utilized more effectively in the hands of the 
people to build their own economies, democracies, and 
competitiveness. Improving the macroeconomic statistics of a poor 
country is not enough. Aid must benefit the poor people of a poor 
country (Ekins, 1989). Poverty dramatically distorts the time 
preference of resource use, perhaps to the point where extinction is 
optimal (see Chapman, 1992b). Only by eradicating poverty, can the 
international community address the longer term protection of the • 
.. 
global climate. 
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In addition, although politically unpopular, a push for equal 
representation for the Third World in multilateral institutions is a 
necessary step for international equality. This political process 
starts with revamping the Global Environmental Facility, the 
organization designated as the "interim" funding agency in the 
Framework Convention. 
In terms of effectiveness, linking policies in population 
control, economic development, energy taxation, and forestation, 
could bring about atmospheric C02 stabilization. Chapman and 
Drennen (1990) investigated a treaty initiative which would reduce 
developing country population growth and increase income growth, 
while taxing energy and foresting 10 million acres annually. A 
doubling of C02 was avoided under such a scenario, while the tax 
revenue, mainly from the industrialized nations, was assumed 
available for renewable energy research and energy efficiency 
implementation in developing countries. Again, masking the 
solutions to waste and poverty under a single market avoids firm, 
effective decisions on energy, development, popu lation, and forestry 
policy. 
The legal and societal precedent of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) 
treaties lays the groundwork for similar C02 treaties with time 
scales for compliance, efficient and fair levels of commitment, and 
international aid for development. 
• 
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CONCLUSION 
By separating the risks of environmental degradation into the 
dual causes of Northern wastefulness and Southern poverty, global 
C02 emissions can be viewed at two levels: "luxury" and 
"subsistence". Shue (1992) notes that the "central point about 
equity is that it is not equitable to ask some people to surrender 
necessities so that other people can retain luxuries." The central 
point about efficiency is that it is more efficient to reduce excess 
than to stine growth. Tradable C02 permits seem likely to shuffle 
responsibility and avoid efficient abatement, and therefore 
effectiveness in reducing C02 emissions growth is unlikely. 
•
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